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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
DEMETRIOS AGATHANGELIDES 
and DIANE AGATHANGELIDES, 
husband and wife, and GREEK 
GARDENS, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs/ 
Respondents. 
vs. 
KEITH SHAW and SANDRAW SHAW, 
husband and wife, each 
individually and d/b/a 
SPRINGCOLOR SYSTEMS, INC., 
Defendants/ 
Appellants. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The portion of this case which is on appeal arises 
out of Plaintiffs1 sale of a sprinkler installation business 
to Defendant Springcolor Systems, Inc. The sale arrangements 
were set forth in an Agreement and attached Promissory Note. 
Appendix Documents #1 (Agreement and Note). Plaintiffs brought 
suit to collect the Note. Defendants answered and counterclaimed 
raising affirmative defenses of failure of consideration because 
of Plaintiffs1 breach of the Agreement and requested attorneys 
fees therefore. See Appendix Documents #2 (Complaint), #3 
(Answer) and #4 (Counterclaim). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Plaintiff's Complaint, filed 12 August 1980, 
against Defendant involved two claims stated as separate causes 
-1-
APPELLANTfS 
BRIEF ON APPEAL 
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i 
of action. The First Cause of Action was a suit brought solely 
against Defendant Keith Shaw individually and d/b/a Springcolor 
Systems, Inc. on the $10,333.78 Promissory Note given for the 
purchase of the sprinkler installation business. See Appendix 1 
Document #3 (Complaint). The Second Cause of Action was an 
unrelated claim of Plaintiff against Defendants Keith Shaw and 
Sandra Shaw for partnership contributions of $46,667.67 arising 
out of an alleged partnership to construct improvements at the 
Willow Creek Golf Course. Id. This Second Cause of Action was 
voluntarily dismissed by the Plaintiffs with prejudice on July 12, 
1982. Hearing Transcript of July 12, 1982 at pp. 1, 4-5. 
Upon Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
First Cause of Action, the court entered a Memorandum Decision. 
Appendix Document #5. That Decision provides in relevant part 
that Plaintiff is granted summary judgment on the Promissory Note * 
but that Defendant will be allowed to try the "affirmative defenses 
and counterclaims" relative to the Note and Agreement "there 
appearing to be factual issues for determination at trial." Id. 
Defendant Shaw timely objected to the Order tendered by the ( 
Plaintiff, urging that no summary judgment could be granted "while 
affirmative defenses unresolved remain outstanding". Court 
File at 270. Nevertheless the court entered an Order granting 
summary judgment while simultaneously finding Defendant's { 
Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims presented factual issues 
for determination at trial. Court File at 271. 
On February 8th and 9th of 1982 the remaining issues 
were tried to a jury. The court announced to the jury at the ^ 
beginning of the trial that it had granted summary judgment to 
I 
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the Plaintiff on the note against the Defendant and that the 
jury need only fix attorneys fees on that claim. ReporterT s 
Transcript at 40. No mention is made that Defendant has 
affirmative defenses with respect to the Notes which are to be 
tried. Id. at 40-41. Defendant was allowed to introduce at 
trial all of the evidence supporting the affirmative defenses; 
to wit that Plaintiff breached the noncompetition clause of the 
Agreement and also that Plaintiff failed to correctly pay over 
monies as requried in the Agreement between the parties. 
The Special Verdict form presented to the jury made 
no allowance for affirmative defenses relative to the Note. 
Appendix Document #6 (Special Verdict Form) . Defendant's counsel 
duly and timely objected and excepted to the form of the special 
verdict. Reporters Transcript at (Vol.11) 233-235. The jury 
returned entering the sum of $4500.00 in answer to Question #1 and 
circling the answer (b) as to Question #2. See Appendix Document 
#6 (Special Verdict Form) . 
Thereafter the parties disputed what judgment should 
be rendered on the Special Verdict Form. The court rendered a 
Memorandum Decision respecting the issues raised. Appendix 
Document #7 (Memorandum Decision). The court then subsequently 
entered judgment for the Plaintiff against Keith Shaw, Springcolor 
Systems, Inc. , a Utah corporation and Sandra Shaw for the full amoi 
of the note, interest, $4800.00 attorneys fees and $471.40 costs. 
Appendix Document #8 (Judgment). Defendants moved: (1) for a 
new trial, (2) judgment notwithstanding the verdict, (3) 
restriction of the judgment to Springcolor Systems, Inc. 
(4) segregation and/or denial of costs assessed, (5) entry 
of findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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• ( 
issues decided by the trial court and (6) objected to the 
form of judgment. All of Defendant's motions were denied. This 
appeal followed. 
I 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
1. Sandra Shaw requests that the judgment against her 
be vacated by this Court. 
2. Defendants request that the Court find that as a 
matter of law breach of the Agreement by Plaintiff constituted 
a valid affirmative defense to payment of the Note. Further, 
that based on the jury verdict findings of a breach by the Plaintiffs 
and the tender offers made by the Defendant, that an order be 
entered by this Court directing the trial court to: 
(a) Strike from the judgment any award of attorneys | 
fees to the Plaintiff. 
(b) Strike from the judgment any award of interest 
to the Plaintiff. 
(c) Strike from the judgment any award of costs to | 
the Plaintiff. 
(d) Conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine and 
award to Defendant an offset for the actual attorneys 
fees and costs incurred by Defendants in defense 
and prosecution relative to the Plaintiff's First 1 
Cause of Action and Defendant1^ Affirmative 
Defenses and Counterclaims. 
(e) Conduct an evidentiary hearing, if the parties 
can't stipulate, as to the offset to be allowed 
Defendant Shaw for Plaintiff's breach of the non- " 
competition agreement and failure to pay over 
monies. (One or both of these breaches by the 
Plaintiff were found to have occurred by the 
j^y.) 
(f) Enter further orders consistent herewith. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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3. As an alternative to the above to simply vacate 
the judgment and remand for new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiffs formally executed sale documents on 
June 27, 1979 for sale of a sprinkler installation business to 
Springcolor Systems, Inc., a Utah corporation. The sale documents 
were an Agreement and attached Promissory Note. The Agreement 
provided in relevant part that $18,971.73 would be credited to 
Springcolor Systems, Inc. for monies received on subcontracts 
where Defendant worked for Plaintiff Greek Gardens. The 
Agreement also provided that Plaintiffs would not compete with 
Springcolor Systems and that 107o of the purchase price was for 
purchase of "good will11. The Agreement also specified that the 
balance of $10,333.75 owing by Springcolor Systems, Inc. to 
the Plaintiffs would bear interest at fourteen percent (14%) 
and be payable in $400 a month installments. See Appendix Document 
#1. 
Simultaneously with the execution of this Agreement a 
Promissory Note was also executed and attached to the Agreement. 
This note simply restated the terms for the payment of the 
balance owing. The amount of the Note was $10,333.78 payable 
at 14% in $400.00 a month installments. The Note and Agreement 
were executed simultaneously, bearing the same payment terms 
and the same date; the Note simply quotes a portion of the 
Agreement. The Plaintiffs are the payees of the Note and it is 
executed by Springcolor Systems, Inc., a Utah corporation. 
One payment was made on this obligation when the 
parties became embroiled in a dispute. Springcolor Systems, Inc., 
refused to pay any further money alleging Plaintiffs were 
violating the non-competition agreement and were refusing to 
pay over additional monies earned on subcontracts between 
Plaintiffs and Springcolor. Plaintiffs took the position that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Springcolor was not entitled to the subcontract monies and that ' 
Plaintiffs were not in breach of the non-competition agreement. 
An additional dispute was between the Plaintiffs and 
Defendants Shaw over whether or not an earlier partnership had 
existed involving the Willow Creek Golf Club and whether or not ' 
the Shaws owed the Plaintiffs money as a partnership contribution 
thereon. 
Prior to Plaintiffs filing the lawsuit against Defendants 
Shaw, Springcolor offered to pay in full the balance owed on 
the Agreement and Note, including interest. Reporter's Transcript 
at pp. 137-138, see generally at pp. 133-140. Springcolorfs 
offer to abandon its claim for Plaintiffs refusal to pay over
 g 
subcontract money and for Plaintiff's violation of the non-
competition agreement was conditional .upon the dismissal of any 
and all other claims Plaintiffs might have against Springcolor 
or Defendants Shaw including the alleged Willowcreek partnership « 
contribution claim. Id. 
Plaintiffs refused that offer and commenced a lawsuit 
against Defendants. The Complaint named as Defendants "Keith 
Shaw and Sandra Shaw, husband and wife, each individually, and 4 
d/b/a SPRINGCOLOR SYSTEMS, INC.'1 The Defendant Keith Shaw and 
the Defendant Sandra Shaw were served. 
The First Cause of Action in the Complaint is against 
Defendants Springcolor and Keith Shaw on the Promissory Note. % 
It alleges nonpayment and a number of allegations are made to 
the effect that Defendant Keith Shaw was an alter ego of 
Springcolor and that the Springcolor corporate veil should be 
pierced so as to allow a personal judgment against Defendant Keith • 
Shaw. The prayer for relief names Springcolor Systems, Inc. 
and tha Defendant Keith Shaw and requests the note amount 
($9,842.11), interest, $4000.00 attorneys fees and $10,000.00 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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punitive damages. Defendant Sandra Shaw is not named in the 
First Cause of Action. 
The Second Cause of Action is against Defendants Keith 
Shaw and Sandra Shaw for partnership contribution on the alleged 
Willowcreek Partnership. The sum of $46,667.67 is requested 
in the prayer for relief. 
Defendants, Springcolor and Keith Shaw answered 
the First Cause of Action admitting execution of the promissory 
note but alleging t!the same was part and parcel of an agreement 
not performed by Plaintiffs'1. Defendants also pled as an 
affirmative defense that: 
Plaintiffs are estopped from suing hereon having 
failed to perform their agreement with Defendants 
which was the consideration for said note. 
See Appendix Document #3, Paragraph #8. The counterclaim 
filed later specified Plaintiff's breaches of the Agreement: 
That Plaintiffs have breached their agreement of 
June 27, 1979, with Defendants in that Plaintiffs 
have failed to account for funds due Defendants 
on subcontracts, have entered into competition against 
Defendants and have failed to release Defendants 
from liability on the Willowcreek project. 
See Appendix Document #4, Counterclaim at Paragraph #1. 
Because of the cost and risks of litigation Defendants 
endeavored to settle or compromise the monetary obligation on 
the Agreement and Note to Plaintiffs. That is, Defendants were 
willing in a settlement made to waive Plaintiff's breaches of the 
Agreement to avoid the costs and risks of litigation. There 
were no less than four separate offers to pay principal and intere 
in full to the Plaintiff; to wit: 
1. Oral offer prior to filing of suit 
2. Written Letter to Plaintiff4"s Attorney of 
December 12, 1980. Appendix Document #9 
(Exhibit # ) . 
3. Offer of Judgment dated February 4, 1981. 
Appendix Document #10. 
4. Offer of Judgment dated November 23, 1981. 
ADDendix Document #11. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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These offers were met with the repeated refusal of Plaintiffs 
to accept any of the offers. Plaintiffs insisted initially 
that it would not dismiss the partnership claim. Later when 
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed that claim there was an 
i 
insistence that significant attorneys fees be paid. See Court 
File at 158. 
The Plaintiffs proceeded with extensive discovery 
relating primarily to the second cause of action. See Court File , 
Index. Several motions for summary judgment by Plaintiffs were 
denied by the court. See Court File at 100 and 157. At the 
initial time set for trial Plaintiffs moved orally to dismiss 
their second cause of action with prejudice and for a summary ^ 
judgment on the first cause of action. Defendants accepted the 
dismissal of the second cause of action with prejudice. Hearing 
Transcript of July 12, 1982 at pp. 1, 4-5. At that point Sandra 
Shaw ceased to be a party. Defendants proceeded to object to | 
further delays and also to the timing of Plaintiff's motions. 
Over Defendants objections the court granted a continuance so 
that written motions could be presented by the Plaintiffs. Id. 
The Plaintiffs then presented their third motion for 4 
summary judgment on the first cause of action. The Defendants 
filed the same responses, admitting the execution of the note 
but alleging failure of consideration as earlier set forth. 
The court,, however, this time acting through the newly appointed • 
Judge Call, rendered a partial summary judgment on the note 
against Springcolor Systems, Inc. for principal and interest 
noting however that "PlaintiffTs Motion for dismissal of 
Defendant's affirmative defenses and counterclaims for 
breach of contract and attorneys fees is denied, there 
appearing to be factual issues for determination at trial." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The court also proceeded to state that it reserved for trial 
"the liability of Keith Shaw and Sandra Shaw on the note and 
attorneys fees to Plaintiffs on the note.11 See Memorandum 
Decision and Order, Appendix Documents #5 and #6. 
The Defendants timely and properly noted that no 
partial summary judgment could be rendered when affirmative 
defenses remained unresolved. Appendix Document #7. Never-
theless, given the judgefs wording and Rule 56(d) the court's 
action may properly be an "order specifying the facts that appear 
without substantial controversy.11 It should be noted that 
Defendant Shaw admitted execution of the note, what payments 
had been made and the method of calculation of interest. 
Defendants sole defense was failure of consideration stated three 
ways in the pleadings, to-wit: as a denial of the Plaintiff's 
allegation of "good and valuable consideration"; as an 
affirmative defense and again as a counterclaim for nonperformance 
of the agreement. See Answer and Counterclaim, Appendix Documents 
#3 and #4. 
Under these rulings the matter proceeded to trial. 
The judge commenced the trial by announcing to the jury that 
he had rendered summary judgment to the Plaintiffs on the Note 
and all they needed to decide on that cause of action was what 
were reasonable attorneys fees. Reporter?s Transcript at Vol. I 
40. 
The court then proceeded to hear testimony relating to 
Plaintiff!s attorneys fees. Over Defendants1 objections 
Plaintiff,1 s attorney was not required to segregate time between 
the two causes of action or for time spent relative to piercing 
the corporate veil. ReporterTs Transcript at Vol. II 37-49. See e 
37-39. In fact, Plaintiff's attorney was allowed to take the 
stand and, without a question and answer format, discuss legal 
fees and his billings in general. Reporter's Transcript Vol. II 
at 34-40. The mutual provision for attorneys fees was contained 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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in both the Agreement and Note signed by the parties. Plaintiff's < 
attorney introduced legal billings relating to the second cause 
of action, piercing the corporate veil, and defending the counter-
claim without any time segregation whatsoever. The Defendants 
objections are duly noted in the record. Reporter's Transcript * 
Vol II at 37-39. The Defendants also note that offers were made 
to pay the note in full before litigation began. See Statement 
of Facts at page 7 These offers were refused not because 
Defendants refused to pay the note but because Plaintiffs insisted * 
on pursuing the Willowcreek Partnership claim which they later 
abandoned. 
In chambers, the court prepared instructions and a 
special verdict form. The Defendants attorney duly objected 
to the verdict form as the same did not allow for findings related 
to the allegations of affirmative defenses. Reporter's Transcript 
Vol II at 233-235. The court then stated and found as a matter
 m 
of law that inasmuch as the note was a negotiable instrument the 
defense of failure of consideration was barred. The court did 
indicate that were Defendants Shaw to prevail on their counter-
claim he would only allow an offset. See Special Verdict Form, g 
Appendix Document #6. 
The jury returned the verdict form with the sum 
$4,800.00 as an answer to question #1 and with "bfl "both parties" 
as an answer to question #2. I_d. The jury was directed to f 
answer no further questions. Id. The Defendant has always 
admitted making no payments on the note so the jury had to find 
Defendant breached the Agreement because it simply restates the 
Note. Compare the Agreement at Paragraph 2(b)(2) with the Note. 4 
See Answer at Paragraphs 2-4. Appendix Documents #1 and #3. 
The jury finding that Plaintiffs also breached the Agreement 
indicated the jury affirmatively found that Plaintiffs violated 
the agreement by competing with the Defendant and/or refusing • 
to pay over monies. Defendant won its case showing a valid 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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affirmative defense and counterclaim. 
The Defendants have filed numerous objections to the 
entering of the court's judgment, motions for new trial, etc. 
The court has denied all such motions. The court entered 
judgment against Defendant Keith Shaw, Defendant Sandra Shaw and 
Springcolor Systems, Inc. in the amount of $9,842.11 plus interest, 
attorneys fees of $4800.00 plus costs of $471.40. Appendix 
Document #12. 
In reviewing this case the Court must accept the 
legitimacy of the jury finding that Plaintiffs breached the 
Agreement. Defendants alleged three specific breaches by Plaintiff 
to wit: 
1. Failure to account for monies as required by 
Paragraph 6 of the Agreement. 
2. Failure to abide by the noncompetitions clause 
as required by Paragraph 4 of the Agreement. 
3. Failure to grant a release on Willowcreek 
partnership. (Defendants always denied any 
liability and the existence of this partnership -
this objection later became irrelevant as Plaintiffs 
dismissed this claim with prejudice. 
Answer at Paragraphs 3 and 8, Appendix Document #3; Counterclaim 
at Paragraph 1, Appendix Document #4. 
At trial Defendants sought to prove the affirmative 
defense of failure of consideration by the two specific breaches 
stated at (1) and (2). The failure to turn over monies related 
to a specific identified incident where Plaintiff refused to turn 
over $1802.00. That incident occurred prior to Defendant's 
refusal to pay monthly installments on the Agreement and Note. 
The other breach related to the Plaintiff1s activities in several 
bidding contests wherein the Plaintiff bid on sprinkler only jobs 
and to Plaintifff s interrelationship with one of Defendants 
principal competitors. The Plaintiffs denied any breach and 
contested the affirmative defenses. The jury, finding that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Plaintiffs breached the Agreement must indicate as a matter 
of law that Defendant proved either one or both of these 
alleged breaches. The clumsy verdict form, however, does 
not allow for \ more specificity. The finding that Defendant 
also had breached the Agreement is obvious because the Agreement 
restates the obligation to pay $400.00 monthly installments and 
Defendant freely admitted he was not making those because of 
Plaintifff;s prior breaches. As the Note is restated in the ..  
Agreement no other conclusions aire possible. No other breach of 
the Agreement other than non-payment was ever alleged against 
the Defendant. 
In summary, the Court by reason of a careful review 
of the jury special verdict can factually determine affirmatively 
that Plaintiff did breach the Agreement and that Defendant 
did prove the affirmative defenses. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The trial court on August 19, 1982, rendered a 
Memorandum Decision granting Plaintiff partial summary judgment. 
See Memorandum Decision, Appendix Document #5. Subsequently this 
Decision was set forth in an Order. Court File at 267; 
The Decision and Order each recite that Defendant's 
affirmative defenses remain to be decided as there are "factual 
issues for determination at trial.ff It is Defendants position 
that it is legally improper to render a summary judgment where an 
affirmative defense remains undecided. See Rule 56 URCP. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Specifically in this case Defendant alleged that 
there was a failure of consideration, i.e. that the Defendant 
did not receive good and valuable consideration for the Note 
inasmuch as Plaintiffs were in actual and open breach of the 
Agreement for which the Note was given, to wit: 
1. Plaintiffs were competing with Defendant; and 
2. Plaintiffs were refusing to pay over subcontract 
monies. 
Defendant Springcolor admitted execution, delivery, amour 
interest and non payment of the Note but alleged a prior breach 
by Plaintiff of the Agreement. Under these circumstances it would 
have been entirely appropriate for the trial court pursuant to 
Rule 56(d) "to have made an order specifying the facts that 
appear without substantial controversy11. The court could have 
done that with respect to Defendant's admission of execution, 
delivery, amount, accrued interest and non payment of the Note. 
To have gone further and actually rendered a judgment while an 
affirmative defense was outstanding was error. 
Defendant justifiably could be expected to relft on the 
court's promise embodied in both the Memorandum Decision and 
Order that it would allow trial of the affirmative defenses. 
Under this factual situation the error was avoided by the 
Defendant's ability to obtain a stay and post a bond or letter 
of credit until trial. This the Defendant elected to do, a 
letter of credit was posted and a stay obtained. When the 
court during the trial reversed itself and held the Defendant's 
affirmative defenses were not affirmative defenses it made the err 
insurmountable. Defendant was misled by the express words of the 
court; the court refused to abide by its own orders. See 
Memorandum Decision and Order, Appendix Documents # 5. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS LEGAL RULINGS RESPECTING 
THE NOTE AND DEFENSES THERETO. 
The trial court separated the Note and Agreement and * 
treated them as separate legal obligations. The trial court 
found that Plaintiff's breach of the Agreement would not be 
a defense to Defendant's nonpayment of the Note. The trial * 
court also found the defense of failure of consideration was 
invalid because the Plaintiff was a holder in due course of 
the Note and as such was insulated from this defense. Defendant 
submits that the trial court is in error as a matter of law 
on each of the foregoing conclusions of law. 
The duties and obligations as set forth in the Agreement 
and its attached Note were mutual and reciprocal. Indeed the 
two documents for all purposes should be regarded as one 
agreement. 
The well-settled rule that instruments relating 
to the same transaction and contemporaneously 
executed are to be considered as one instrument g 
and are to be read and construed together as such 
in determining the intent of the parties, if the 
instruments are not contradictory, applies to 
bills and notes and writings in connection there-
with, as between the original parties and all 
persons charged with notice, especially where the 4 
instruments are executed for the same purpose, or 
where the bill or note incorporates the provisions 
of another agreement, or refers to it, or is attached 
to the other agreement. 
11 AmJur 2d Bills and Notes §70 at 94. (emphasis added, footnotes • 
omitted). The evidence at trial indicated that the two documents 
refer to the same transaction, were contemporaneously executed, 
were executed for the same purpose, incorporated the same Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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provisions and were attached to each other. 
Under the rule that contemporaneous written agree-
ments are construed together as parts of one contract, 
there can be no objection, as between the parties 
. thereto, to evidence of a contemporaneous written 
agreement on the ground that it tends to vary the 
effect of the contract on a bill or note. Evidence 
of the entire contract in its several parts is 
admissable to determine the rights of the parties. 
In an action between the original parties to a note 
where it is alleged that the note was a part of a 
transaction for the sale and purchase of stock in a 
corporation, the entire transaction being evidenced 
by the note, the stock certificate, and an escrow 
arrangement, it is appropriate to show all the docu-
ments evidencing the agreement between the parties as 
constituting the entire transaction as distinguished 
from merely producing the promissory note as an 
isolated segment of the transaction. 
12 AmJur 2d Bills and Notes §1244 at 276. (footnotes omitted). 
The two documents are irretrievably bound together for purposes 
of interpretation and enforceability. One cannot reasonably 
contend that the promissory note can be enforced as though it 
were an "isolated segment of the transaction." Yet that is 
exactly what the trial court did. See Special Verdict Form 
Appendix Document #6 
The Uniform Commercial Code, in setting forth the rights 
and duties of parties dealing w ith documents which may become 
negotiable instruments specifically delineates this exception to 
negotiability: 
(1) As between the obligor and his immediate obligee 
or any transferee the terms of an instrument may be 
modified or affected by any other written agreement 
executed as a part of the same transaction, except 
that a holder in due course is not affected by any 
limitation of his rights arising out of the separate 
written agreement if he had no notice of the limita-
tion when he took the instrument. 
§70A-3-119 UCA 1953. The Plaintiffs cannot enforce this 
obligation set forth in the Note in a vacuum. As a matter of 
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• ( 
law; Plaintiff's rights under the Note are bound to Defendant's 
rights under the Agreement, one is consideration for the other. 
The Plaintiffs breach of the Agreement is a legal defense to the 
Defendant's obligation to pay: ( 
It is also the rule that a party may not insist upon 
the performance of a contract or a provision thereof 
where he himself is guilty of a material or substantial 
breach of that contract or provision. The party 
first committing a substantial breach of a 4 
contract cannot maintain an action against the other 
contracting party for a subsequent failure to perform 
if the promises are dependent. A failure to perform a 
promise, the performance of which is a condition 
precedent, is an excuse for nonperformance of the 
promise or promises made by the other party. ^ 
17 AmJur 2d Contracts §425 at 880. (footnotes omitted). 
As a rule, a party first guilty of a substantial 
or material breach of contract cannot complain if the ^ 
other party thereafter refuses to perform. He can * 
neither insist on performance by the other party 
nor maintain an action against the other party for a 
subsequent failure to perform. At least, the party 
first committing a substantial breach of a contract 
cannot maintain an action against the other contracting * 
party for a subsequent failure to perform if the 
promises are dependent. It has also been said that 
where a contract is not performed, the party who is 
guilty of the first breach is generally the one upon 
whom rests all the liability for the nonperformance. 
Furthermore, there is authority that if the breach g 
of a stipulation in a contract is willful, the party 
guilty of the breach is barred from recovery. 
17 AmJur 2d Contracts §365 at 807. (footnotes omitted). 
When Plaintiffs first filed a Complaint, Defendant 4 
answered admitting execution of the Note but denying an obligation 
to pay because the Note was "part and parcel of an agreement 
not performed by Plaintiffs.ff Answer at Paragraph #2, Appendix 
Document #3. Plaintiffs First Affirmative Defense further stated • 
that Plaintiffs were estopped from suing on the obligation by 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-17-
reason of Plaintiffs failure to "perform their agreement with 
Defendants which was the consideration for said note.11 Id. 
at Paragraph #8. At a later date Defendants filed a counterclaim 
that stated these defects in Plaintiffs performance specifically, 
to wit: 
Plaintiffs have breached their agreement of 
June 27, 1979 with Defendants in that Plaintiffs 
have failed to account for funds due Defendants 
on subcontracts, have entered into competition 
against Defendants and have failed to release 
Defendants from liability on the Willowcreek 
Project. 
Counterclaim at Paragraph #1, Appendix Document #4. The last 
defense became inconsequential when Plaintiffs dismissed that 
claim with prejudice in the summer of 1982. Defendant's other 
two defenses remained as both affirmative defenses and counter-
claims . The court acknowledged their presence and viability 
in its Order reserving those two matters for trial. Memorandum 
Decision, Appendix Document 5 . 
The jury's special verdict indicates beyond question 
that Plaintiffs did breach their contract with Defendants. The 
special verdict answer does not indicate on which defense 
Defendants prevailed or if Defendants prevailed on both, but 
Defendants did prevail on at least one legal defense. Each 
of those defenses constitutes a legal defense to the obligation 
on the agreement and note. Special Verdict Form, Appendix 
Document # 6 
The PlaintiffT,s argument that somehow their case is 
insulated from this defense is clearly wrong. Plaintiffs are 
not holders in due course: 
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes 
the instrument 
(c) without notice . . . of any defense 
against or claim to it on the part""" 
of any person. 
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§ 70A-3-302 UCA 1953. Plaintiffs dealt directly with Defendant. 
Defendant agreed to pay money to Plaintiffs as expressed in the 
Agreement and repeated in the Note. In return Plaintiffs 
expressly promised not to compete and to pay over on subcontracts.
 ( 
Each knew and agreed to these duties. This was one agreement 
with consideration to each party. The jury found that Plaintiffs 
breached their agreement. That breach constitutes a legal defense 
between these parties and is a bar to Plaintiff's enforcement < 
of the Note. 
!Want or failure of consideration is a defense as 
against any person not having the rights of a 
holder in due course'. . . . 
§70A-3-408 UCA 1953. 
The Note and Agreement should be treated as one 
agreement setting forth the rights of the parties with mutual 
ongoing, and reciprocal promises by each. Plaintiff's breach 
of the Agreement is a valid affirmative defense to Defendant's 
obligation on the Note. Plaintiffs are not holders in due 
course. First Investment Company v. Anderson 621 P2d 683 -
(Ut 1980) . 
III. THE TRIAL COURT MISINTERPRETED THE SPECIAL JURY VERDICT 
FORM. 
i 
The Defendant has urged that the trial court erred in 
using a special verdict form which treated the Note as entirely 
distinct from the Agreement between the parties. Further, that 
it erred as a matter of law and disobeyed its own Order and 
commitment when it set up a form which failed to allow for 
Defendant's affirmative defenses to the Note. Nevertheless it 
is Defendant's position that the Court can correct the trial
 — 
court's errors by properly interpreting that returned special 
verdict form. 
Defendant urges that the jury's decision embodied in the 
S p e c i a l v e r d i c t " f o r m wax m i Q i n ^ f l - m r Q ^ Q ^ KTT +-U~ 4—-r~i 
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(This argument is best followed by reviewing the Form, Appendix 
Document # 6 while considering the argument.) Inasmuch as 
the Defendant admitted execution and nonpayment of the Note 
the exact words of which are also embodied verbatim in the 
Agreement; the jury as a matter of law and obvious fact could 
not choose an answer indicating that Defendant was not in 
breach of the Agreement. This rules out any answer which 
indicates Defendant was not in breach, namely Maff and "c". 
Defendant's breach was openly admitted; the entire case was 
that Defendant's breach was excused by Plaintiff's own prior 
and continuing breach of the same Agreement. If Defendant failed 
to prove this defense the jury could clearly choose answer "d". 
If the Defendant proved the breach of Plaintiff, the only answer 
the jury could give and which is left is answer f,bM. That is the 
answer the jury chose. The judge erred in entering a judgment 
against the Defendants and for the Plaintiffs; clearly the 
Defendants proved their case. 
The judge's interpretation of Question #2's answer 
creates a situation where any result,results in a loss to the 
Defendant. All answers lead to the same result; Plaintiff wins 
the face amount of the Note, interest and attorney fees. 
If the jury answers "b", they are instructed to make 
no further determinations; whereupon the court entered judgment 
for the Note, interest and attorney fees. That was the result. 
Results "a" and "c" are wrong as a matter of law and fact, as 
Defendant admitted breach and alleged defenses. Result "d" 
could only lead to a further judgment against Defendant. Out of 
four possible results, two are barred by law and the other two 
lead to a judgment against Defendant for the Note, interest and 
attorney fees. Under the judge's method of interpretation, no 
possible result could have been in Defendant's favor. 
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Defendant submits that the trial judge's interpretation < 
is erroneous. The answer "b" is a jury finding that Plaintiffs 
were in breach of the Agreement. As the two specific breaches 
alleged by Defendant both antedated nonpayment of the Note and 
were material and significant breaches, Defendant's nonperformance < 
is excuseable. That bars recovery of interest, attorneys fees 
and costs by the Plaintiffs. Defendant should also be granted 
judgment for damages in the amount proven to result from those 
breaches. Unfortunately the court barred the jury from * 
proceeding to determine amounts. 
The Defendant alleged failure to pay #1802.00 over on 
a specific subcontract and for a recovery of damages for 
competition in the amount of the $2505.00 goodwill set forth in 
the original Agreement. The Court can either remand for an 
evidentiary hearing on these amounts or simply direct the trial, 
court to enter the lower figure which Defendant would accept so 
as to avoid the retrial of this matter. 
The point is that the jury found in favor of the Defendant1 
allegation of Plaintiff's breach of the Agreement. The trial 
court's misinterpretation of the special verdict form can be ^ 
corrected by this Court although further evidentiary hearings 
may be necessary. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S < 
OFFERS OF JUDGMENT. 
The court record is replete with numerous offers of the 
Defendant to pay the Note in full in several different dates: 
1. Oral offer prior to filing of suit 
2. Written Letter to Plaintiff's Attorney of 
December 12, 1980. Appendix Document #9. 
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3** Offer of Judgment dated February 4, 1981. 
Appendix Document #10. 
4. Offer of Judgment dated November 23, 1981. 
Appendix Document #11. 
The Defendant has explained that these offers were made not 
because of a disbelief in the correctness of the affirmative 
defenses and counterclaims but because the legal costs and 
risks of enforcing its rights exceeded the probable benefits of 
winning. 
The Defendant's dilemna should be made clear to this 
Court. The Defendant considered its legal position and the 
expenses of enforcing that position carefully both before and 
during this litigation. For that reason, the Defendant made 
a full price offer on the Note before suit was commenced and 
subsequently in writing on two separate occasions. The Plaintiffs 
refused these offers for two reasons. Initially, they were refuse 
because Plaintiffs wished to pursue the Second Cause of Action 
or wanted alternatively some hold on the Defendant Shaw respecting 
his testimony in that case. The Plaintiff's voluntary dismissal 
with prejudice of that cause of action when finally pushed to 
trial thereof is equivalent to the release requested by Defendants 
The refusal of the offers on this ground is legally indefensible. 
By the time they had abandoned this Second Cause of Action, 
Plaintiffs had incurred substantial legal fees so now their 
refusal was based on Defendant ?:s refusal to pay those fees. 
The only material reason the Plaintiffs refused to 
accept Defendant's offer of full payment on the Note was 
because of a desire to pursue an unrelated claim on a purported 
partnership. Defendants made a legal decision not to contest the 
Note and that offer is duly recorded. If Plaintiffs had prevaile< 
on the Second Cause of Action the offers would be ineffective 
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but given their dismissal the offers constituted offers of full 
payment on the Note. Defendants urge that it is unconscionable 
to place them in a position of increased liability where Plaintiffs 
rejected those offers to pursue an abortive claim Plaintiffs < 
later acknowledged to be without merit. The only excuse 
Plaintiffs can offer for running up costs and attorneys fees is 
that they desired to make a recovery on the Second Cause of 
Action. Defendants should not be required to pay the costs < 
and attorneys fees thereby resulting. As a matter of law the 
trial court should have held Plaintiffs refusal to accept 
these offers barred and estopped Plaintiffs from recovery 
thereof. A 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES TO THE PLAINTIFFS 
IS IN ERROR. 
Defendants have previously discussed the interrelationship 
of Plaintiff's attorneys fees and the Defendant's offers of 
settlement at Section VI hereof. Defendants urge that Plaintiff's 
counsel's refusals to segregate time or costs between the two | 
causes of actions bars Plaintiff's recovery of attorneys fees. 
Mr. Malouf testified that his arrangement with his 
client was for a one-third contingency on the First Cause of 
Action and for hourly billings on the Second Cause of Action. i 
Reporter's Transcript at Vol. II 45-46. Mr. Malouf admitted 
that he did not segregate his time between the two causes of 
action. Id. at 47-49. Mr. Malouf even admitted that he 
refused to may any effort to segregate time at his deposition. * 
Id. at Vol. II, page 48 line 22 to page 49 line 15. See 
Deposition of Ray Malouf at pp 13-14. 
At trial Mr. Malouf asked for one-third of the Note as 
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reasonable attorneys fees. In support of this request he 
stated that: 
The amount of charges which I have recorded for all 
of the work done on this case amounts to a total 
through trial of $7,023.26. The billing that I am 
entitled to on collection on the note is somewhat 
• less than that. A third of' the note in round figures 
would be $4,900.00, which is all I would be entitled to 
for work and collection on the Note. 
Reporter's Transcript at Vol. II p. 38. He referred to that same 
amount again in his closing argument to buttress his claim for 
fees. Id. at 210. While Mr. Malouf did not request that 
amount he uses it to support the reasonableness of a one-third 
contingency fee of $4900.00. Indeed, hourly billing charges 
are a necessary support to show the reasonableness of a contingent 
fee. Mr. Malouf failed and refused to segregate his time 
charges for this purpose. 
The unfairness of Mr. Maloufs billing systems becomes 
obvious when his testimony is studied. On December 12, 1980, 
Defendant offered to pay the Note, principal and interest in full 
Mr. Malouf was asked what a fair attorneys fee for Mr. Shaw 
to pay was as of that date. He testified first that a fair fee 
was $1000.00. Reporter's Transcript at 54-57. Mr. Malouf testifi 
that "I looked at my time to that point". Reporter's Transcript 
at Vol III page 55 line 9. A letter is then introduced which 
shows that Plaintiff's counsel at that time demanded #1300.00 
for attorneys fees to that same date. Exhibit #9. Mr. Malouf 
explains this contradiction by stating "so I will correct my 
former testimony that a reasonable fee would be at least $1300.00 
Reporter's Transcript at Vol II pg. 62 lines 5-8. Inasmuch as 
Mr. Malouf had submitted a time billing at his Deposition the 
Court will note that his total time and costs on all causes of 
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( 
Raymond Malouf, Insert at Back. This waffling makes it clear 
why Mr. Malouffs refusal to segregate time is prejudicial error. 
With some humor it is noted that the special verdict < 
form in Question #1 does not indicate to whom the attorneys 
fees are to be awarded. See Appendix Document # 6 It asks 
the question in a completely abstract way. Plaintiff's 
attorney asked for an award of one third; which he computed to i 
be $4900.00. Reporter's Transcript at Vol II page 38 line 7. 
Defendant's attorney submitted a billing of $4809.22. Exhibit 
#16. The jury entered the sum of $4800.00. 
This Court in Imperial-Yuma Production v. Hunter, 609 * 
P2d 1329, 1331, (Ut 1980) dealt with this same issue: 
The promissory note which defendants signed with 
Imperial-Yuma contained an agreement that defendants would 
pay reasonable attorney's fees and costs required to 4 
collect on the note. At trial, plaintiff's counsel 
testified the fee for his time came to $7,164.00, but 
he had "made no allocations as between the various 
aspects of the case in terms of time." If all counsel's 
time had been spent in collecting on the note, there 
would be no question about the recoverability of his • 
fees. However, since defendant filed a counterclaim 
that contained claims different from those related to 
the note, plaintiff's counsel should have subtracted 
from his total hours the number spent on the counterclaim. 
Two recent cases bear on this point. In Stubbs v.
 m 
Hemmert, 567 P2d 168,171 (Utah 1977), this Court held • 
attorney's fees could be charged to the opposing 
party "only if there is a contractual or statutory 
liability therefor." Counsel in that case was not 
allowed to recover for the time he spent in defense 
of a counterclaim. In Nelson v. Newman, 583 P2d 60, * 
603-04 (Utah 1978), the court cited Stubbs in disallowing 
attorney's fees where counsel could not show how much 
time he had spent on collecting on notes. 
This case involved a second cause of action which % 
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed. That cause of action not 
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the Note was the real primary cause of this litigation. 
This case involved a claim for punitive damages against Defendant 
Keith Shaw that Plaintiffs failed to prove. This case involved 
a claim that Plaintiffs were entitled to pierce the corporate 
veil and hold Defendants Shaw personally liable, that also 
the Plaintiffs failed to prove. Another major part of the case 
were Defendant's affirmative defenses and counterclaims which 
Defendant proved and Plaintiffs lost with respect thereto. The 
only part of the case that Plaintiffs succeeded with was the 
Note and Defendant admitted that in the Answer filed. Plaintiffs 
have incurred excessive attorneys fees in a group of losing, 
nonsensical and irrelevant claims. Defendant should not have 
to pay the cost thereof. 
VI. THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE ENTRY OF ANY JUDGMENT 
AGAINST KEITH SHAW OR SANDRA SHAW. 
Sandra Shaw ceased to be a party to this litigation when 
the Second Cause of Action was dismissed on July 12, 1982. See 
Hearing Transcript at 1,3-4. The remaining First Cause of 
Action requests no relief whatsoever with respect to Sandra 
Shaw and none should be granted. See Complaint, Appendix Document 
£2. 
Keith Shaw is alleged to be the alter ego of the 
corporate Defendant and Plaintiff alleged entitlement to pierce 
the corporate veil and attach personal liability to him. No such 
proof was ever offered by Plaintiff at trial and no such judgment 
can be rendered against Defendant Keith Shaw. 
It should be noted that to forestall any collection 
activities by the Plaintiff on the partial summary judgment, 
Defendant Springcolor Systems, Inc., had previously presented 
a Letter of Credit in the amount of $14,000.00 to the court. 
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See Court file at 309, Appendix Document #12. Because of this 
placement of a Letter of Credit there was no reason to pursue 
piercing the corporate veil. The court actually held the Letter 
of Credit at the time of the trial and the same was a valid 
posting of security by Defendant Springcolor Systems, Inc. { 
There is no legal basis whatsoever to enter any judgment 
against these two individual Defendants. 
VII. IRRESPECTIVE OF WHAT OTHER RELIEF IS GRANTED THE COURT i 
SHOULD CORRECT THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF COSTS. 
At the time the trial court held its April 7, 1983 
hearing preparatory to entering its judgment on the special verdict! 
Defendant's counsel objected to the award of costs of $471.40. 
Hearing of April 7, 1983 at 10,11. The bases of the objection was 
that the majority of the costs related to Plaintiff's Second 
Cause of Action which was dismissed. TA. The court acknowledged ' 
the cost memorandum was in error on this point, indicated what 
changes were incorrect but refused to correct the same. The 
court also refused to ask for a segregation of costs as to 
4 
causes of action: 
THE COURT: ITm saying the $43.60 and the $353.80 at 
this point in my opinion are not proper charges. 
MR. DAINES: Will the court amend its judgment to 
reflect that? 
THE COURT: No; I?m simply telling you that because 
I don't want to spend two or three days waiting for a judgment . 
of amendment and getting it signed and holding it up any longer . . 
MR. DAINES: Your Honor, excuse me, the problem with 
that is, Your Honor, is if you are acknowledging that there is 
something improper about your judgment right now, we should | 
correct it right now, and I don't see that we need to extend the 
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delay. Let's just put a different figure on there right now so 
we don't have to deal with that issue on appeal. 
MR. MALOUF: I object to that. 
THE COURT: Well, and he thinks that I am wrong and 
so why not? If you are going to appeal it, you just as well 
have them pass on that. 
MR. DAINES: Inevitably then they will have to reverse 
you, in part. 
THE COURT: Well, neither one of you have furnished 
me anything on that other than your views, so I'm giving you 
my views but we will leave the judgment in as it is. 
MR. DAINES: Well, Your Honor, I don't know how to 
make an appeal on that issue because without him being forced 
to even segregate them, the Supreme Court is not going to take 
evidence as to what they are, what those costs are. 
THE COURT: Well, thatfs your argument. 
MR. MALOUF: I don't think we have to segregate them. 
MR. DAINES: Well, now, wait a minute, I can't go up 
on appeal and say the Court entered a judgment and then acknowledg 
that part of it was wrong, and Malouf says, well, it's not wrong 
because of these reasons, and we are going to be back to try and 
introduce evidence that the Supreme Court doesn't have before it. 
THE COURT: Well, be that as it may, we are going to go, 
Hearing Transcript of April 7, 1983 at 29, 31-32, Appendix 
Document #13. 
The Defendants point on this issue is simple; a large 
portion of the costs being assessed relate to the Plaintiff's 
Second Cause of Action which was dismissed with prejudice. 
Defendants position is that having dismissed this cause of 
action with prejudice no costs therefore can be assessed. The 
court refused to correct the error despite admitting the same 
was in error. The court also refused to require Plaintiff's 
counsel to segregate those costs. Admittedly that leaves this 
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Court in a quandry because the necessary evidentiary 
background is not available. Defendants would suggest that 
irrespective of what it does on the broader issues in this case 
the Court should reverse the judgment in part and remand for an 
evidentiary hearing on this question or alternatively simply 
strike the $43.60 and $353.80 cost assessments referred to by 
the trial court judge. 
' ' • • • ' • ' i 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants urge this Court to correct the numerous 
legal errors made by the trial court in its handling of this { 
matter. The trial court's refusal to correct even the most 
obvious legal errors such as the costs assessed against Defendants 
when the court openly admits'knowledge of its error indicates 
casual indifference to justice. While that is an error of no ( 
great consequence it is not a nominal error to enter and allow 
a $20,000.00 judgment against a non party to litigation such as 
Sandra Shaw. There is no justification for such a judgment. 
The court's on again off again treatment of Defendant's ^ 
affirmative defenses has resulted in manifest injustice, significan* 
monetary loss and is clear legal error. All of this has occurred 
in a factual mileau wherein the Defendant in jury trial has 
proven the soundness of its allegations and defenses. ' 
DATED this 3{j day of August, 1983. 
DAINES & KANE 
N. George Datees 
A t t o r n e y a t Law 
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